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Abstract 
 
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) enables a 
new way of inter-organizational collaboration via a 
shared and distributed infrastructure. There are plenty 
of DLT designs (e.g., Ethereum, IOTA), which differ in 
their capabilities to meet use case requirements. A 
structured comparison of DLT designs is required to 
support the selection of an appropriate DLT design. 
However, existing criteria and processes are abstract 
or not suitable for an in-depth comparison of DLT de-
signs. We select and operationalize DLT characteris-
tics relevant for a comprehensive comparison of DLT 
designs. Furthermore, we propose a comparison pro-
cess, which enables the structured comparison of a set 
of DLT designs according to application require-
ments. The proposed process is validated with a use 
case analysis of three use cases. We contribute to re-
search and practice by introducing ways to operation-
alize DLT characteristics and generate a process to 
compare different DLT designs according to their suit-
ability in a use case. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Given the high potential of distributed ledger tech-
nology (DTL), numerous DLT designs have been de-
veloped during the past decade (e.g., Ethereum, IOTA, 
and Tezos). Such DLT designs specialize in fulfilling 
requirements of a particular set of applications on DLT 
in domains such as the Internet of Things (IoT), fi-
nance, and supply chain management. However, this 
specialization resulted in trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics that restrict the suitability of a DLT de-
sign to a particular set of applications [1, 2]. For ex-
ample, a DLT design cannot provide high availability 
and a high degree of consistency simultaneously be-
cause a large number of nodes of the ledger, which is 
needed for high availability, requires more time and 
effort to be synchronized, thereby challenging con-
sistency [1, 2]. Due to the prevalent trade-offs between 
DLT characteristics, the improvement of one DLT 
characteristic deters another, inhibiting a one-size-fits-
all DLT design suiting all requirements of individual 
applications. Trade-offs thus require developers to 
choose the best fitting DLT design for their application 
[2]. Making careful and well-founded decisions in fa-
vor for an (appropriate) DLT design to develop viable 
applications on DLT becomes even more crucial be-
cause technical differences between DLT designs 
(e.g., different data structures and consensus mecha-
nisms) impede the ex-post migration of data stored on 
one distributed ledger to another [3]. 
Developers, therefore, need to conduct a compre-
hensive comparison between prospective DLT designs 
to assess DLT designs’ suitability for a particular ap-
plication on DLT before starting the actual implemen-
tation. Such comparisons require the operationaliza-
tion of DLT characteristics that is referred to as a pro-
cess of defining the measurement of DLT characteris-
tics to make them understandable, measurable, and 
comparable. However, it remains challenging for de-
velopers to compare DLT designs and operationalize 
DLT characteristics because DLT synthesizes multiple 
techniques of computer science (e.g., cryptography 
and distributed databases), which come with individ-
ual operationalizations for characteristics. In addition, 
DLT exhibits unique characteristics, such as stale 
block rate and smart contract support [1], requiring 
new operationalizations. The operationalization of 
DLT characteristics must first be clarified to enable 
developers conducting comparisons of DLT designs. 
Research on DLT in computer science has already 
taken different perspectives on the analysis, operation-
alization, and benchmarking of DLT designs, for ex-
ample, in regard to formal verification of consensus 
mechanisms (e.g., [4]) and the analysis of DLT de-
signs in different configurations (e.g., [5, 6]). How-
ever, prior research predominantly considers DLT 
characteristics related to performance (e.g., [7, 8]) and, 
thus, neglects further important characteristics (i.e., 
flexibility, anonymity) and does not allow a holistic 
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 comparison of DLT designs. Research on DLT in in-
formation systems deals with the specification of pro-
cesses to support developers in their selection of an ap-
propriate DLT design for an application (e.g., [9, 10]), 
among others. However, the presented processes are 
often too abstract to compare DLT designs. To con-
duct a comprehensive comparison of DLT designs it 
requires the synthesis of the prevalent research streams 
on the operationalization of DLT characteristics and 
benchmarking DLT designs, and decision support in 
the selection of an appropriate design. We ask the fol-
lowing research question (RQ): 
RQ: How can DLT designs be compared according 
to application requirements prior to implementation? 
To answer the RQ we follow two objectives: first 
the identification and operationalization of relevant 
DLT characteristics and, second, the development of a 
process for the comparison of DLT designs. For the 
first, we consolidated a set of DLT characteristics that 
we deem relevant for applications on DLT and synthe-
sized existing research on benchmarks and operation-
alizations of DLT, distributed databases, and infor-
mation systems. Second, we generated and validated a 
process for the comparison of DLT designs with three 
prominent use cases. 
With our study, we contribute to practice as we en-
able a comprehensive comparison of DLT designs 
and, thus, provide decision support for the selection of 
a suitable DLT design for viable applications on DLT. 
We contribute to research because we synthesize ex-
isting approaches and generate new means for the op-
erationalization of DLT characteristics. Thus, our re-
sults can serve as a foundation for research on the se-
lection of suitable DLT designs for applications. 
 
2. Related research 
 
2.1. Distributed ledger technology 
 
DLT serves as a shared, digital infrastructure for 
applications (e.g., financial transactions) because DLT 
enables the operation of an append-only database (re-
ferred to as ledger), which is distributed across multi-
ple storage devices (so-called nodes) in an untrustwor-
thy environment [11]. Each node maintains a local rep-
lication of the data stored on the ledger. An untrust-
worthy environment is characterized by the arbitrary 
occurrence of Byzantine failures [12] such as crashed 
or (temporarily) unreachable nodes, network delays, 
and malicious behavior of nodes (i.e., issuing wrong 
information). In DLT, data is appended to the ledger 
through transactions and is stored in a chronologically-
ordered sequence. Each transaction contains meta-data 
(e.g., receiver address, timestamp) and a digital repre-
sentation of certain, tokenized assets or program code 
of a smart contract. A tokenized asset is a digital rep-
resentation of an asset (e.g., coins) in a structured data 
format (token), which can be transferred using trans-
actions. When a node receives a new transaction, the 
transaction is validated. Valid transactions are for-
warded to all adjacent nodes, which also validate and 
forward the transaction subsequently. 
Because all nodes of a distributed ledger maintain 
a local replication of the ledger, all nodes must be syn-
chronized and agree on a common state of the distrib-
uted ledger to reach consistency. For this purpose, a 
consensus mechanism is employed [13]. A consensus 
mechanism is used to manage the negotiation between 
nodes, which eventually agree on a common replica-
tion of the ledger. Once appended, data can hardly be 
altered or removed anymore. 
 
2.2. Comparison of DLT designs 
 
The comparison of DLT designs requires taking 
both a technical perspective considering DLT charac-
teristics, such as fault tolerance or throughput, and an 
economical perspective considering costs and time for 
software development. Therefore, we first present re-
lated research in benchmarking DLT characteristics. 
Second, we present related research on supporting de-
velopers to select a suitable DLT design in order to 
avoid, for example, high switching costs. Benchmark-
ing forms a measurement of a (non-productive test) 
system at a specific point in time [14] and allows for 
the comparison of systems in artificially created sce-
narios. To date, DLT benchmarking predominantly fo-
cuses on DLT characteristics related to performance 
and security (e.g., throughput, network partitioning) 
[5, 15], specific use cases [16], or private DLT designs 
[17]. Still, such approaches do not allow for holistic 
benchmarking of DLT designs because they do not 
consider DLT characteristics such as availability or 
cost. Since DLT incorporates multiple domains of 
computer science (i.e., databases, cryptography, infor-
mation systems), DLT benchmarking must also con-
sider extant research in these disciplines.  
Database benchmarks include characteristics such 
as transaction speed and consistency. Meanwhile, in-
dustry standards have been established for database 
benchmarks with a focus on transaction execution, 
performance, and scalability (e.g., TPC-H). While 
these operationalizations might be used for certain 
DLT characteristics, database benchmarks do not 
cover several unique DLT characteristics (e.g., confir-
mation latency, fault tolerance). 
Extant research in cryptography already provides 
operationalizations for characteristics related to hash-
ing or public-key encryption, which are substantial for 
DLT. From the performance perspective, for example, 
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 time complexity of such encryption algorithms is an 
important criterion to assess. From the security per-
spective, the collision resistance of hashing algorithms 
is a common criterion to validate a hashing algorithm 
against pre-image attacks [18]. Although the opera-
tionalization of cryptographic procedures is useful to 
measure in DLT, these operationalizations serve only 
one (research) domain DLT draws from. 
Related research on decision support to find an ap-
propriate DLT design is still in its infancy. There are 
already approaches that support the decision of using 
DLT or not (e.g., [10]) and several classifications of 
DLT design have been proposed to make DLT and its 
characteristics better comprehensible for developers 
(e.g., [19]). However, such processes do not consider 
the operationalization of DLT designs and, thus, are 
only applicable to DLT on a limited scale. 
 
3. Method 
 
We applied a four-step research approach. First, 
we reviewed the extant literature on DLT to generate 
a preliminary set of characteristics, which are relevant 
for DLT design comparison (e.g., [1, 22]). Second, we 
searched operationalizations of the respective DLT 
characteristics in extant literature. Third, we evaluated 
the suitability of DLT characteristics and correspond-
ing operationalizations for the comparison process fol-
lowing well-known IT benchmarking requirements 
and quality criteria for metrics (e.g., [14, 20, 21, 23]; 
cf. Table 1 and Table 2). Finally, we generated a DLT 
comparison process and evaluated its usefulness using 
three use cases and five DLT designs (i.e., Ethereum, 
Hyperledger Indy, IOTA, Tezos and Hashgraph). 
 
3.1. Selecting suitable characteristics for the 
comparison of DLT designs 
 
To identify candidate DLT characteristics for our 
comparison process, we built on our prior research on 
identifying and clustering DLT characteristics [1, 24, 
25], leading to a set of 37 DLT characteristics. More-
over, we reviewed further research articles and white-
papers on DLT characteristics (e.g., [1, 19, 26]) and on 
DLT benchmarking (e.g., [22]), which led to a final set 
of 50 DLT characteristics as candidates for the com-
parison process. We classified these DLT characteris-
tics into qualitative and quantitative sub-groups to 
conduct a more structured search for operationaliza-
tion approaches. As a next step, we performed a fo-
cused literature search for each DLT characteristic to 
identify potential operationalizations in DLT research 
and related research streams (i.e., databases, cryptog-
raphy, information systems). In particular, we 
searched in scientific databases, including IEEE 
Xplore, EBSCOHost, ACM Digital Library, and 
Proquest. For each DLT characteristic, we created a 
unique search string comprising the name of the DLT 
characteristic (i.e., scalability) and synonyms for op-
erationalization (i.e., benchmarking, metrics, meas-
urement). We reviewed the resulting research articles 
and noted proposed operationalizations for each char-
acteristic. The identified operationalizations can be 
classified into three different categories: First, opera-
tionalizations found in the (non-) scientific literature 
on DLT that could directly be inherited into the com-
parison process (e.g., operationalizations for con-
sistency or confirmation latency). Second, operation-
alizations found in related domains that needed to be 
adapted to fit the DLT context, such as operationaliza-
tions for developer support, scalability, or availability. 
Lastly, we were left with four DLT characteristics 
(i.e., traceability, transaction content transparency), 
where no applicable operationalizations were found. 
For these DLT characteristics, we developed new met-
rics complying with the criteria from Table 2. 
To assess whether identified DLT characteristics 
are suitable for DLT design comparison, we evaluated 
whether they fulfill the requirements for IT bench-
marks (cf. Table 1) and whether corresponding opera-
tionalizations comply with requirements for quality 
metrics (cf. Table 2). For more information see “Ex-
clusion Methodology” in the supplementary online 
material (https://bit.ly/2klPK9v). First, we investi-
gated if identified operationalizations are consistent. 
Table 1. Summary of requirements for IT benchmarking [14, 20, 21] 
Requirement Description 
Economic Efficiency It must be economically affordable to run the benchmark. 
Fairness Fairness means that a benchmark should treat every system under test fairly and equally and should not make assumptions 
on the system’s features. 
Portability It should be easy to implement the benchmark on many different systems and architectures. 
Relevance The benchmark should focus on typical operations within that problem domain. 
Reproducibility Reproducibility implies that running the same benchmark multiple times will yield similar results, meaning that a certain 
degree of determinism is required. 
Simplicity The benchmark must be understandable, otherwise, it will lack credibility. A key aspect is the presence of meaningful and 
expressive metrics. 
Scalability The benchmark should apply to small and large computer systems. It should be possible to scale the benchmark up to larger 
systems and to parallel computer systems as computer performance and architecture evolve. 
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 We excluded 17 DLT characteristics (i.e., governance, 
non-repudiation, interoperability) because a consistent 
output of identified operationalizations could not be 
guaranteed as, for instance, the operationalizations re-
quire a subjective view on qualitative DLT character-
istics. For example, we excluded the DLT characteris-
tic compliance because a metric that operationalizes 
compliance would have a strongly varying output de-
pending on the particular regulations, thereby threat-
ening consistency. As a next step, we excluded five 
DLT characteristics (e.g., incentive mechanism) that 
did not follow the high-resolution criteria of quality 
metrics (cf. Table 2). The remaining DLT characteris-
tics fulfill the requirements for quality metrics, includ-
ing correlation, discriminative power, and tracking. As 
the last step, we examined if the final set of DLT char-
acteristics fulfills all requirements for IT benchmark-
ing (cf. Table 1). We removed eight DLT characteris-
tics that did not comply with the relevance criteria, 
leading to a final set of 20 relevant DLT characteristics 
for the comparison process. For example, block crea-
tion interval was excluded because it is expressed in 
throughput and stale block rate [27], which can be di-
rectly mapped to application requirements. 
 
3.2. Comparison process development 
 
We grounded the development of a comparison 
process on previous research of benchmarking pro-
cesses in the IT field (e.g., [28, 29]). We also drew 
from extant research on benchmark process develop-
ment (e.g., [29]) and adapted it to the field of DLT un-
der consideration of the requirements depicted in Ta-
ble 1. We used [29] as a basic approach for a bench-
marking process and adapted it in two discussion 
rounds with researchers to fit the DLT context while 
complying with the requirements from Table 1. Dur-
ing this adaptation, the important core steps of the 
comparison process were identified, adapted and en-
hanced to our use case. The individual steps were then 
renamed to keep consistent terminology. We showed 
the usefulness of the comparison process by evaluating 
the process in three prominent use cases in the field of 
DLT: cryptocurrency, IoT, and identity management. 
We selected these use cases because they form a high 
percentage of identified DLT use cases in research 
[30] and currently worked on by large companies [31]. 
For each use case, we applied the comparison process 
and included five strongly different DLT designs, 
which have been developed for different purposes: 
Ethereum as a general-purpose blockchain, Hashgraph 
as a public multi-purpose DLT design, IOTA with a 
focus on IoT, Hyperledger Indy for identity manage-
ment, and Tezos for strong governance to ensure a 
wide variety of different ledgers and to show the use-
fulness of the process for different DLT designs. We 
chose these DLT designs because they strongly differ 
in the used data structures (e.g., Hashgraph and IOTA 
follow the concept of transaction-based, directed acy-
clic graph instead of a linked chain of blocks like in 
Ethereum, Hyperledger, and Tezos), the applied con-
sensus mechanisms (e.g., IOTA uses the Tangle and 
Ethereum relies on Proof-of-Work), and in their per-
missioning (Ethereum as a permissionless DLT de-
signs and Hyperledger Indy as permissioned DLT de-
sign). Thus, we show that the developed operationali-
zations are applicable to a variety of DLT designs and 
reflect their individual strengths. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. DLT characteristics for the comparison 
 
4.1.1. Flexibility. Flexibility incorporates the possibil-
ities offered by a DLT design for maintenance and fur-
ther development [1]. The purpose of tokens (F1) can 
be classified into achieving three different objectives: 
payment tokens (e.g., Bitcoin), utility tokens (e.g., 
Filecoin), and security tokens (e.g., tZERO). Smart 
contract support (F2) is a qualitative characteristic that 
can be mapped to a nominal scale: either a DLT design 
offers Turing-complete, Turing-incomplete, or no 
smart contracts. 
 
4.1.2. Institutionalization. Institutionalization de-
scribes the embedding of concepts and artifacts (here 
DLT) in social structures. Developer support (I1) is 
mainly driven by the size of the developer community 
currently dealing with a particular DLT design. There-
fore, we operationalize developer support as the num-
ber of active developers. A developer is considered ac-
tive if she has at least one commit to a DLT design 
core (e.g., Ethereum Protocol) or a project related to a 
Table 2. Summary of requirements for quality metrics [14, 23] 
Requirement Description 
Consistency The output of the metric should be consistent. A monotonic function is often required. 
Correlation There should be a (not necessarily linear) correlation between the dimension under observation and the metric output. 
Discriminative 
Power 
The metric should accurately display differences of parameter levels and especially differentiate between high and low pa-
rameter levels. 
High resolution The metric should have a large number of possible output values and should avoid unnecessary aggregation. 
Tracking The metric should build on the current state of the system. 
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 DLT design (e.g., an application using the DLT de-
sign) on GitHub during the last three months. Liability 
(I2) is classified as a qualitative characteristic that we 
map to a nominal scale with binary values existence of 
or non-existence of an enterprise organization for the 
purpose of operationalization. 
 
4.1.3. Anonymity. Anonymity describes the degree to 
which individuals are not identifiable within a set of 
users [1]. Node verification (LA1) is predominantly 
concerned with granting or revoking permissions for 
nodes. Thus, we mapped node verification to the DLT 
design types public or private to consider read permis-
sions. For write permissions, we distinguish between 
permissioned and permissionless DLT designs. 
For traceability (LA2), we chose three distinct val-
ues: publicly-viewable transfers (e.g., in Bitcoin); ob-
fuscated transfers (e.g., using mixing [32]); not trace-
able transfers (e.g., in ZCash). For transaction content 
transparency (LA3) we chose a binary value that dis-
tinguishes between data stored in plain text or en-
crypted. 
 
 
4.1.4. Performance. Performance includes DLT char-
acteristics regarding the accomplishment of a given 
task measured against standards of accuracy, com-
pleteness, costs, and speed [1] such as confirmation la-
tency, throughput, and scalability. Confirmation la-
tency (P1) refers to the period required to append a 
minimum number of blocks to the distributed ledger 
that must at least succeed a certain block b to assure 
that b cannot be altered anymore (e.g., [33]). We oper-
ationalize confirmation latency (P1) as duration until a 
transaction is seen as finalized.W 
For scalability (P2), we focus on horizontal scala-
bility (cf. [17]), which is operationalized by changes 
to throughput (P3) and mean transaction latency 
(MTL) when the number of validating nodes (de-) in-
creases. For operationalization, we use p-scalability 
[34] (cf. formula 1), which compares two differently 
scaled system levels k1 and k2 according to the power 
metric (cf. formula 2) and scaling cost [34]. We relay 
this concept to DLT by excluding the cost factor and 
replacing the mean delay with the mean transaction la-
tency (MTL) (cf. [17]). 
 
Table 3. DLT characteristics and their operationalization following [1, 8, 22] 
* DLT Chars.** Definition Operationalization 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Purpose of the To-
kens (F1) 
The purpose and flexibility in usage of the provided tokens 
of a DLT design. {
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛
 
Smart Contract Sup-
port (F2) 
The level of how well smart contracts are supported by a 
DLT design. {
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 
 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l.
 Developer Support 
(I1) 
The existence of documentation, interaction platforms such 
as forums, or direct contact to the team developing the dis-
tributed ledger for questions and issues related to the devel-
opment of applications integrating DLT as well as program-
ming tools and interfaces. 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠 
Liability (I2) The existence of an organization that is responsible for the 
maintenance of a DLT design. 
 {
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
A
n
o
n
y
m
it
y
 
Node verification 
(LA1) 
The extent to which new nodes can join the distributed 
ledger without being verified. 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐, 𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
 
Traceability (LA2) The level to which the transfer of an asset can be traced 
chronologically on a distributed ledger.  {
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑
 
Transaction Content 
Transparency (LA3) 
The ability to publicly view an account’s holdings and trans-
actions’ contents on a distributed ledger. 
 {
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
P
e
r
fo
r
m
a
n
ce
 
Confirmation La-
tency (P1) 
The average time until enough blocks (or transactions) are 
added to the distributed ledger so that the likelihood of tam-
pering of a previously added block or transaction is below a 
certain threshold. 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
∗ 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 
Scalability (P2) The capability of a DLT design to handle an increasing 
amount of workload or its potential to be enlarged to accom-
modate that growth. 
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑘2)
𝑀𝑇𝐿 (𝑘2)
 
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑘1)
𝑀𝑇𝐿 (𝑘1)
 
 𝑀𝑇𝐿 > 0, 𝑘1 < 𝑘2 
Throughput (P3) The number of transactions validated and appended to the 
ledger in a given time interval. 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 
 
*   DLT Property ** DLT Characteristics 
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 (1) 𝑝 − 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑘2)
𝑀𝑇𝐿(𝑘2) ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑘2)
 
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑘1)
𝑀𝑇𝐿(𝑘1) ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑘1)
 
 
(2) 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 =  
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑀𝑇𝐿
 
 
In (1), throughput behaves proportionally to scala-
bility, while transaction latency behaves anti-propor-
tionally to scalability. For example, if a DLT scales up 
well, one would expect throughput to increase and 
transaction latency to decreases. This behavior is rep-
resented in our metric by placing throughput in the nu-
merator of the metric and the transaction latency in the 
denominator. To form a score for scalability, we com-
pare two different horizontal scaling levels k1 and k2 
with different numbers of participating nodes as our 
metric. We assume MTL to never converging to zero. 
Usually, a scalability coefficient equal to or larger than 
1 reflects good scalability, while a scalability coeffi-
cient close to zero indicates bad scalability. The quo-
tient of the data from the actual period is compared to 
the performance data quotient from the previous pe-
riod to form the scalability score which is then com-
puted into a final scalability score (P2). 
 
4.1.5. Security. Security refers to the preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of infor-
mation. Availability (S1) is operationalized as proba-
bility and considers the Meant Time To Failure 
(MTTF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) [35]. 
MTTF is the period a distributed ledger is expected to 
correctly operate. MTTR is the required period to re-
cover the distributed ledger from a failure. This sum is 
equal to the Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) [35]. 
In the field of DLT, we refer MTTR and MTTF to the 
full distributed ledger instead of particular nodes. 
Consistency (S2) refers to storing the identical rep-
lications of the ledger on each node at the same time 
[36]. In Hyperledger Caliper, transaction latency is a 
metric to measure consistency as the period for a trans-
action’s effect to be available on all nodes [8]. We 
adopt this interpretation and measure the period be-
tween transaction issuance and transaction confirma-
tion. We include it as a criterion in form of an average 
of N measurements at different times and states of the 
distributed ledger. Fault tolerance (S3) is the ability of 
a distributed ledger to correctly operate in the presence 
of failures [35]. We operationalize fault tolerance as 
the changes in throughput and transaction latency (TL) 
during node failure (cf. [17]). Node failure is the stop-
ping of a node (crash failure), network delay, or ran-
dom responses due to corrupted messages [17]. 
Level of decentralization (LoD) (S4) expresses the 
ratio of the number of independent validating nodes 
(VNs) and the number of validating node operators 
(VNOs). While VNs represent validating nodes, 
VNOs represent an individual or organization, who 
maintains the VNs (e.g., a mining pool). To include 
permissioned DLT designs in our operationalization, 
Table 3 cont. DLT characteristics and their operationalization following [1, 8, 22] 
* DLT Chars.** Definition Operationalization 
S
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
Availability (S1) The probability that a system is operating correctly at an arbi-
trary point in time. 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
=
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
 
Consistency (S2) The state that all nodes store the same data in their ledger at the 
same time. ∅ 𝑇𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1
− 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑡) 
Fault Tolerance (S3) The ability of a distributed ledger to correctly operate in the 
presence of (hardware or software) failures. 
{
∆ 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒
 ∆ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒
 
Level of Decentrali-
zation (S4) 
The number of independent node controllers participating in 
transaction validation and consensus finding. 
 
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑠 
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑁𝑠
∗  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑠 
Network Size (S5) The number of validating nodes of a distributed ledger that 
keep a full replication of the ledger. 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
Reliability (S6) The period of time during which a system is correctly function-
ing. 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑡) =  𝑒
(−
𝑡
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹) 
Stale Block Rate 
(S7) 
The number of blocks in a defined period of time that has been 
mined but not added to the distributed ledger. A stale block 
forms a fork until it is resolved by the DLT design’s fork reso-
lution rule. 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 1000 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 
 
Strength of Encryp-
tion (S8) 
The level of security of the applied cryptographic approach. 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 
U
sa
b
il
it
y
 Censorship Re-
sistance (U1) 
The equal right of any user of the distributed ledger to submit 
transactions that are not altered or dropped by a third party. 
𝐿𝑜𝐷
𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑠
=  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑠 
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑁𝑠
 
Cost (U2) Costs related to the implementation and usage of a DLT design, 
including software development and operational costs. 
 
∅ 𝐻&𝐸 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
+ ∅𝑇 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗  
∅ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
+  
∅ 𝑀&𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
 
 * DLT Property ** DLT Characteristics  VN: Validating Node  VNO: Validating Node Operator 
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 we multiply the ratio of VNs to VNOs with the number 
of VNs to correctly scale it to the network size and to 
differentiate between permissioned DLT designs with 
a lower LoD score and permissionless networks with 
a higher LoD score due to a higher number of VNOs.  
Network size (S5) describes the number of nodes in 
a distributed ledger that stores a full replication of the 
ledger, considering only full network nodes that keep 
a full replication of the ledger [1]. Thus, we operation-
alize network size as the number of full nodes in a dis-
tributed ledger. 
Reliability (S6) refers to the period during which a 
distributed ledger is correctly functioning. In DLT, the 
component that may fail refers to the complete distrib-
uted ledger [35]. The operationalization yields a prob-
ability that the system produces a correct output up to 
a time t [35]. For our benchmarking process, we intro-
duce the estimated project duration t for all DLT de-
signs and require a certain probability. Due to the little 
occurrences of system failures of DLT designs, this 
metric is assumed to be close to one, even for larger t. 
Stale blocks impact security and performance be-
cause they lead to inconsistency between nodes 
through forks. The stale block rate (S7) is operation-
alized as a percentage of the mined but not included 
blocks measured over the last 1000 blocks [7]. Non-
forking consensus mechanisms (e.g., Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance) get the score of zero. 
The strength of encryption refers to the level of se-
curity concerning the application of authentication-re-
lated cryptographic primitives (e.g., hashing algo-
rithm). For the benchmarking process, we use the col-
lision resistance of the applied hashing algorithm in 
the DLT design, which refers to the ease in guessing a 
pre-image for a hash value. A Birthday attack is a 
probabilistic approach of guessing pre-images exploit-
ing the fixed degree of permutations [37]. A Birthday 
attack evaluates a hash function with n input bits and 
m output bits for randomly-selected inputs until two 
matching outputs are found. The number of pairs (p) 
in-between inputs which may yield to a collision 
grows quadratically with the number of trials l in a 
Birthday attack (cf. formula 3). As every pair of inputs 
is a chance for a matching output, finding a collision 
becomes more and more likely. Using a Birthday at-
tack, it is possible to find a collision of two different 
inputs with Formula 4 or better time attack (tattack) [37] 
leading to Formula 5 as the security in (output-) bits 
(sbit) of h. 
 
 
(3) 𝑝 =
𝑙 ∗ (𝑙 − 1)
2 
 (4)     𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 2
𝑚
2  (5)  𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑡 =
𝑚
2
 
 
 
 
4.1.6. Usability. Usability refers to the extent to which 
a DLT design can be used by specified users to achieve 
specified goals with respect to effectiveness, effi-
ciency, and satisfaction in a context of use. Censorship 
resistance (U1) describes the probability that a party 
can strongly influence the acceptance or refusal of 
transactions with a reasonable effort. Little censorship 
resistance comes from a low LoD [1]. Therefore, we 
operationalize censorship resistance as a probability 
dependent on LoD. A high LoD represents high cen-
sorship resistance, which the metric expresses with a 
score close to 1.0. 
Cost (U2) relates to the implementation and use of 
a DLT design. To operationalize cost we draw from a 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) approach and adjust it 
to DLT [38]. Our TCO metric employs the sum of av-
erage Hardware and Electricity (H&E) cost, the aver-
age cost for transactions (e.g., transaction fees), and 
the average Maintenance and Servicing (M&S) cost, 
all computed per month. Costs for research and human 
resources are excluded to keep the calculation feasible 
and because they are assumed to be similar for each 
DLT design since research and hiring of quality per-
sonal needs to be done for all DLT designs. H&E costs 
include the cost for all needed hardware to set up all 
necessary components to participate in the distributed 
ledger to the extent required by the use case, as well as 
the accumulated energy and resource costs of mining 
(if mining is performed). M&S costs cover all mainte-
nance costs to keep the network operational and all 
services used within or outside the distributed ledger. 
 
4.2. Comparison process for DLT designs 
 
We propose a seven-step process for the holistic 
comparison process of DLT designs: use case defini-
tion, requirements definition, DLT design selection, 
boundary condition examination, data collection, 
analysis, and decision making (cf. Figure 1). In the fol-
lowing, we illustrate the usefulness of the comparison 
process for an exemplary use case in IoT. For parsi-
moniousness, we only consider the DLT characteris-
tics consistency (S2) and throughput (P3), which are 
consolidated in Table 4. Please refer to “Use Cases” in 
the supplementary online material for the full compar-
ison (https://bit.ly/2klPK9v). 
First, we define the use case and functional re-
quirements for the application during the use case def-
inition. To assess the usefulness of DLT we include 
the process of [9] into our comparison process, which 
we adapt to DLT in general. The process serves as a 
pre-filter to prevent developers from choosing an un-
suitable technology (e.g., DLT vs. centralized data-
base) beforehand. If DLT has been found suitable for 
the use case, the process continues. 
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 Second, the pursued values of the individual met-
rics are ascertained as forming criteria of the process 
in requirements definition. In the IoT use case, con-
sistency (S2) should be fairly low (< 2 s) because 
many IoT networks share and handle real-time sensor 
data. IoT networks usually incorporate a large number 
of devices and sensors. Therefore, we require through-
put (P3) to be at least 1,000 tps. 
Third, the DLT design selection requires to gener-
ate a set of possibly suitable DLT designs for the use 
case. A survey on the application of DLT designs in 
similar use cases should lead to a set of possible DLT 
designs for the following evaluation process. This set 
should have a cardinality of at least two DLT designs 
but is not restricted by an upper limit. For our exem-
plary use case, we select a set of five DLT designs: 
Ethereum, Hyperledger Indy, Tezos, and IOTA, Hash-
graph. 
Fourth, during the boundary condition examina-
tion potential compliance, legal, and maturity risks of 
members of the previously defined set of possible 
DLT designs are considered. For example, newly de-
veloped DLT designs with an error-prone code base 
that are hardly ready to use may be examined and then 
excluded from the set of candidates. In this step, an 
evaluation of previously excluded qualitative charac-
teristics can be made. All DLT designs, which do not 
comply with these factors should be excluded from the 
set. If too many ledgers are being excluded in this step, 
a step back to DLT design selection towards more DLT 
design candidates may be necessary. The topics ease 
of use, dependencies on third parties (e.g., an enter-
prise, a foundation), auditability restrictions, or data 
ownership considerations can be examined to exclude 
additional DLT design candidates if they are consid-
ered important for the use case. After reviewing possi-
ble legal, compliance and maturity risks, no hindering 
boundary conditions (e.g., prohibiting data-security 
legislation, a non-mature code framework) were 
found. Therefore, we deem all DLT design candidates 
mature and suitable for the exemplary IoT use case.  
Fifth, after all factors are included and a final set 
of DLT design candidates is generated, we conduct a 
data collection to use the developed operationaliza-
tions and to calculate the corresponding metrics. For 
our example, we gathered data on transaction latency 
and transactions per second for every DLT design out 
of the set of DLT design candidates from monitoring 
websites (e.g., [39]) and existing studies (e.g., [17, 
40]) to calculate the values for consistency (S2) and 
throughput (P3). 
Sixth, we compose a table to summarize the found 
results in the analysis step. The table includes all cri-
teria in the columns and lists all DLT design candi-
dates in the rows. For each DLT design candidate, 
every criterion is evaluated on whether the application 
requirement is fulfilled by the respective value of a 
DLT design candidate. If the calculated value of the 
metric fulfills the particular application requirement, 
we rate it 1. If a criterion is only partially fulfilled or 
the application requirement is very close to the actual 
value of the DLT design, we rate it 0.5. Otherwise, the 
table entry is rated 0. 
Finally, the decision making is performed by sum-
ming up the ratings for each DLT design candidate, 
leading to a total score. The DLT design with the high-
est score represents the assumed best suitable DLT de-
sign for the application on DLT. In the exemplary IoT 
use case, Hyperledger Indy scored best (cf. Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sequential steps of the process to compare DLT designs 
Table 4. Evaluation of consistency and 
throughput inside the process to compare 
DLT designs 
 
Consistency 
(< 2 s) 
Throughput 
(> 1000 tps) 
 
DLT Design Candidates 
 
V
a
lu
e 
[s
] 
S
c
o
re
 
V
a
lu
e 
[t
p
s]
 
S
c
o
re
 
∑ 
 
Ethereum <15 0 20 0 0 
Hashgraph n.A.2 0 > 10,000 1 1 
Hyperledger Indy  <21 1 >3,500 1 2 
Tezos <60 0 40 0 0 
IOTA n.A.2 0 500-800 0.5 0.5 
1: Transaction latency is taken from a Hyperledger Fabric eval-
uation. Since both DLT designs employ a similar PBFT consen-
sus algorithm with low latencies the data is comparable. 
2: Transaction confirmation is non-deterministic 
DLT Design
Select ion
Data
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Decision
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Enough DLT candidates?
Yes
No
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No
Yes
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 5. Discussion  
 
In this work, we present a comprehensive overview 
of DLT characteristics and their corresponding opera-
tionalization that can be used as criteria for a holistic 
comparison. Furthermore, we generated a first ap-
proach for a structured comparison process including 
research from DLT, distributed databases, and com-
puter science. The validation of the generated process 
for comparison indicates its validity because the cal-
culated suitability ranking is coherent with the in-
tended purposes of the included DLT design candi-
dates. For each use case, the process proposed a suita-
ble DLT design for which proof of concepts in the re-
spective fields have already been developed. 
We regard the proposed operationalization as a 
first approach for the operationalization of DLT de-
signs for a holistic comparison. Due to the strong focus 
of the included criteria for performance and security, 
the process will probably perform sufficiently for DLT 
designs that are designed for a similar purpose.  
 
5.1. Implications 
 
The presented operationalization of DLT charac-
teristics supports a better comparison of DLT designs 
and helps to quantify their advantages. Using the op-
erationalizations, the presented process supports the 
selection of a suitable DLT design for applications on 
DLT. The process facilitates and structures decision 
making for choosing a DLT design, which avoids un-
necessary overhead and improves decision making. 
The developed process synthesizes extant research 
on DLT from research in computer science as we eval-
uated different operationalizations for DLT character-
istics and present a set of applicable operationaliza-
tions for selected criteria. Through the selection of op-
erationalizations applicable to DLT characteristics, we 
support research on the identification of a suitable 
DLT design in information systems. The presented op-
erationalizations of DLT characteristics support the 
quantification of dependencies between DLT charac-
teristics, which broadens the scope for a comprehen-
sive analysis of DLT designs [33] and helps to reveal 
the weaknesses of current DLT designs. 
 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
 
As the selection and operationalization of DLT 
characteristics are based primarily on literature and the 
presented process has only been evaluated in three use 
cases, we cannot generalize the presented process 
without limitation. As not all DLT characteristics have 
a corresponding characteristic in research on database 
or distributed systems monitoring (e.g., stale block 
rate), we developed own operationalizations. How-
ever, these measures have not been evaluated in the 
field, yet. Some operationalization concepts are re-
stricted to or have a higher significance with block-
chain-based DLT designs. During the data collection 
for the validation of the process, it became obvious 
that DLT and especially some of the chosen DLT de-
signs form a fairly new research topic, thus discover-
ing a need for additional research and practical meas-
urement of DLT characteristics. This work relies on 
previous research on DLT characteristics [1, 24]. 
Thus, we also used the DLT property usability accord-
ing to the examined literature. 
In future research, the presented comparison pro-
cess should be applied and evaluated in the field to as-
sess its validity and overcome potential challenges in 
its usefulness. Additionally, the scoring model and the 
use of weights for the respective importance of DLT 
characteristics should be investigated. Since several 
DLT characteristics are not yet operationalizable, it is 
of high interest to generate new operationalizations for 
such DLT characteristics to obtain a holistic view of 
DLT designs and their benefits and potential con-
straints. Since the importance of cross-chain technol-
ogy in DLT increases [25], additional metrics and op-
erationalizations should be investigated and developed 
in order to make different cross-chain technology ap-
proaches comparable with each other. 
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